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Human Memory and the Limits of Technology in Education 1 
 2 
Abstract Human memory systems perform various functions beyond simple storage and 3 
retrieval of information. They link together information about events, build abstractions, and 4 
perform memory updating. In contrast, typical information storage and access technologies, 5 
such as note-taking applications and Wikipedia, tend to store information verbatim. In this 6 
article, we use results from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and machine learning to argue 7 
that the increased dependence on such technologies in education may come at a price: the 8 
missed opportunity for memory systems of student learners to form abstractions and insights 9 
from newly learned information. This conclusion has important implications for how 10 
technologies should be adopted in education. 11 
 12 
1. Introduction 13 
Numerous technologies are now used within educational settings, with the aim of improving 14 
the learning experience and student outcomes. Examples include: distance/online/virtual 15 
learning; the use of analytics to gather and utilise data about student learning habits; 16 
interactive learning applications/tools; audio-visual teaching aids; and information storage 17 
and access technologies.i The increasing use of technologies within educational settings raises 18 
important questions about the extent to which traditional methods of teaching and learning 19 
should be supplanted by new methods involving the use of technology. In this paper, we 20 
highlight a potential danger to supplanting some teaching methods with alternatives that 21 
involve using technologies.  22 
We focus on the use of what we call information storage and access technologies. 23 
These technologies store information that can easily and rapidly be accessed by anyone with 24 
an understanding of how to use them. They can be contrasted to technologies that directly act 25 
as a means of support to learning activities rather than providing access to information 26 
(Tondeur, van Braak and Valcke 2007). Included in the relevant category are: (i) personal 27 
devices such as flash drives, cloud storage, and note-taking applications, in which students 28 
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can store information that they have been taught; (ii) open access resources such as Wikipedia 1 
or Google that contain information that other people have made available; (iii) restricted 2 
access resources such as digital textbooks or the online learning environments for specific 3 
courses of study, which include course-related documents and resources; and (iv) social 4 
media resources, in which information shared by other people can be accessed and used by a 5 
student in their studies. For some purposes, people may distinguish between devices that store 6 
self-generated information (e.g. note-taking applications) and devices that store other-7 
generated information (e.g. Wikipedia), but for our purposes we treat both equally. 8 
We recognise that these technologies perform numerous important roles within 9 
contemporary education settings, ameliorating the student experience and student outcomes in 10 
a variety of important ways. However, we highlight a danger associated with the adoption of 11 
these technologies within an educational setting. Because of the benefits of the technologies, 12 
some people have argued that educational methods should be overhauled, so that significantly 13 
less emphasis is placed on students engaging in learning that involves storing information to 14 
memory systems in the human brain. We argue that there are important functions performed 15 
by human memory systems— the linking together of information found in different sources, 16 
the production of abstract representations, and the updating of learnt information over time—17 
which are unlikely to be performed if educational methods are overhauled in thus way. We 18 
argue that these functions are essential to the achievement of one of the central goals of 19 
education, i.e.: the transference of learning. Consequently, a move away from storing 20 
information internally in our brains has the potential to have a detrimental effect on 21 
educational outcomes because it can prevent students from achieving transference. Our 22 
argument draws on findings from cognitive psychology, neuroscience and machine learning.    23 
The structure of our argument is as follows. In section 2, we show why information 24 
storage and access technologies are attractive to those working within an educational setting. 25 
In section 3, we highlight the functions performed by internal memory that will be the focus 26 
of discussion. In section 4, we show how these functions are important and valuable within an 27 
educational setting, improving the student experience and learning outcomes by facilitating 28 
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transference of learning—a central goal of education. Then, in section 5, we show that these 1 
functions might not be performed, and transference not achieved, if there is an increased 2 
focus within education on using information storage and access technologies.  3 
 4 
2. The appeal of technology in education 5 
Information storage and access technologies have several features that make them attractive 6 
for use in education. Contemporary digital technologies have large storage capacities. 7 
Information stored to these devices is easily compressed and therefore a large amount can be 8 
stored on small physical devices (Selwyn 2016). The technologies are highly reliable at 9 
storing accurate, verbatim representations of information that are then available for retrieval. 10 
The information stored in these technologies can be easily edited (ibid.), searched through, 11 
copied, and shared. In contrast, human memory systems have only limited storage capacities 12 
(see, e.g. Cherniak 1983, Brady et al., 2011). There is a huge psychological literature 13 
suggesting that people are not only susceptible to forgetting, we are also susceptible to 14 
misremembering (Robins 2016), recalling details of an event inaccurately (e.g. Loftus and 15 
Palmer 1974; Roediger and McDermott 1995; Schacter and Addis 2007). Human memory 16 
systems are therefore fallible with respect to the goal of storing accurate verbatim 17 
representations of information. Finally, human memory systems are largely private. If a 18 
person wishes to access information stored in another person’s internal memory systems, their 19 
success depends on the ability to identify and communicate their need, and on the other 20 
person’s willingness, as well as their ability, to access and to provide this information. 21 
Meanwhile, technologies such as Wikipedia, Google and social media provide easy, public 22 
access to information.  23 
On a view according to which memory works as a storehouse (Sutton 1998), only 24 
functioning to store and provide access to information, the types of technologies that we are 25 
discussing would seem to overwhelmingly, if not only, bring benefits, inside and outside of 26 
education. They provide better storage capacities, more accurate records of information, and 27 
more ready access to a wider set of information than internal memory systems. However, the 28 
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memory-as-storehouse picture has been widely rejected within philosophy of memory (see 1 
e.g. De Brigarde 2014; Sutton 2009, 2010; Michaelian 2011; Robins 2016) and cognitive 2 
psychology (see, e.g. Schachter and Addis 2007; Schachter 2011) and is increasingly being 3 
criticised in neuroscience (see, e.g. Stickgold and Walker, 2013; Eichenbaum and Cohen, 4 
2014; Richards and Franklin 2017). It is now widely accepted that memory systems perform 5 
numerous important functions other than storage and retrieval. Our claim is that these 6 
functions are both important to education and unlikely to be performed if students reduce the 7 
extent to which they internalise information to memory because of the adoption of 8 
information storage and access technologies.   9 
We therefore highlight how discussions within the cognitive sciences put pressure on 10 
positions like that of connectivism within educational theory, according to which it is not the 11 
learning that occurs within a person that is important but instead the networks that they form, 12 
with computer networks, social networks, etc. as it is through these that people can acquire 13 
accurate, up-to-date information (Siemens 2005, Thota 2015). We argue that the learning that 14 
occurs within the person, in their internal memory systems, can be vital to supporting 15 
important functions of learning. Our view also highlights shortcomings of some educational 16 
practices that involve the use of information storage and access technologies to perform 17 
functions traditionally performed by internal human memory systems, e.g. allowing students 18 
to use information storage and access technologies inside the examination room (see, e.g. 19 
Wheeler 2011). We show that there are important functions of human memory systems that 20 
are less likely to be performed if such practices are adopted. 21 
 To be clear, our aim is not to advocate the use of technology-free examinations or any 22 
other specific traditional methods of teaching and learning. It is consistent with the claims 23 
made in the current paper that, for example, the constructivist view of education is correct. 24 
According to constructivism, students should be active learners, using existing knowledge to 25 
engage in activities that lead to the acquisition of further knowledge (Bruner 1996). Adaptive 26 
learning technologies may help accelerate this process by, for example, tailoring feedback or 27 
lines of instruction to suit each particular student (Desmarais and Baker, 2012). It is also 28 
 5 
consistent with the view defended in this paper that both informal and formal methods of 1 
learning are valuable. Informal methods of learning tend to take place outside of a structured 2 
learning environment and do not tend to involve rigorous testing (Marswick and Watkins 3 
1990). One can learn informally outside the classroom in everyday life (Mills and Kraftl 4 
2014). It is consistent with our view that active and informal learning are highly valuable. 5 
What our argument emphasises that if learning, either utilising these methods or not, does not 6 
involve the internalisation of information, student learning can be negatively affected.   7 
   8 
3. Human Memory and Its Functions 9 
The aim of this section is to spell out in more detail the functions other than those suggested 10 
by the memory-as-storehouse view that are performed by human memory systems. It outlines 11 
results from the fields of neuroscience, cognitive psychology and machine learning that show 12 
how the brain mechanisms underlying memory are responsible for: (i) linking together 13 
information about different events, (ii) building abstract representations, (iii) updating 14 
memories in light of most recent information. 15 
 Let us begin with considering how biological memory systems link together 16 
information about different events. In a learning setting, this will usually involve linking the 17 
newly learned information with existing, older memories for other events and concepts. In 18 
neuroscience, this linking is generally thought to occur slowly over days and nights as part of 19 
a larger process termed systems consolidation. Consolidation here is defined as a process that 20 
crystallises new memories so that they become less malleable and more locked-in over time 21 
(McGaugh, 2000). Neuroscientists believe that systems consolidation involves a two-stage 22 
process: first, new memories are encoded in the hippocampus directly following the 23 
experience. Second, over the following days and weeks the newly learned information is 24 
tranferred from the hippocampus to the neocortex where it is linked to existing memories and 25 
stored long-term (Alvarez and Squire, 1994; Buszaki 1989; Marr 1971). Mechanistically, the 26 
basic transfer of information from hippocampus to neocortex is believed to happen via 27 
repeated replay of episodic memories by the hippocampus during sleep (Buszaki 1989; 28 
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Wilson and McNaughton 1994, O’Neill et al., 2010). The idea is that memory replay by 1 
hippocampus during sleep drives neocortical brain networks, activating both some 2 
representation of the new memory, plus related older memories. This co-activation triggers 3 
strengthening of interconnections between the sets of active neocortical neurons, and so links 4 
the new memory with existing knowledge. 5 
 Of the three memory processes we describe, this standard account of systems 6 
consolidation model accounts only for the first (linking together of information). Importantly 7 
however, this consolidation process also seems to parallel the abstraction and generalisation 8 
of memories into simpler representations (Winocur et al. 2007; Stickgold & Walker, 2013). 9 
This is a process that is taken by cognitive psychologists to explain a large range of 10 
memories, as it is thought that representations of the gist of events remain as verbatim details 11 
fade (Brainerd & Reyna 2002). Although it is not known how memory generalisation works 12 
at the neural level, two recent theoretical models have been put forward. Lewis and Durant 13 
(2011) suggest that if multiple memories were to be replayed concurrently by the brain, then 14 
“the overlapping replay of related memories selectively strengthens shared elements”. As the 15 
non-overlapping elements of these memories will not be reinforced, they are more likely to be 16 
forgotten. This model fits with the common-sense view that an abstraction should be built out 17 
of the common elements of different items, while the ignoring their differentiating details. 18 
O’Donnell and Sejnowski (2014) propose a different model for memory generalisation, where 19 
memory replay during non-REM sleep results in a biochemical template being laid down in 20 
the neocortical neurons that were activated by the replayed memory. This template is then 21 
used during the subsequent REM phase of the sleep cycle (when most vivid dreams occur) to 22 
selectively strengthen connections from neurons outside the template to those neurons inside 23 
the template. This should have the effect of broadening the original memory representation to 24 
incorporate a wider set of neurons. In contrast to the Lewis and Durant model, the O’Donnell 25 
and Sejnowski model proposes that generalisations are not formed by finding commonalities 26 
between pairs of memory items, but by taking a single memory and meshing it with existing 27 
prior knowledge about the world, so generalising its contents. 28 
 7 
 A related insight into how human memory generalisation might work comes from the 1 
field of machine learning. Machine learning researchers seek to build computer programs that 2 
learn how to perform a task by encountering example ‘training’ data points and updating their 3 
algorithms accordingly, mimicking how humans learn cumulatively. In this field, it is well 4 
appreciated that the ability of a computer program to generalise from specific training 5 
examples to perform well on a broader set of tasks can be impaired by overfitting. Overfitting 6 
happens when a statistical model learns to capture too well every detail of the specific 7 
examples that it happened to see during training. If these details are irrelevant for the broader 8 
problem, then they may impair generalisation on future tasks. Machine learning researchers 9 
have discovered several methods for reducing the effects of overfitting. One powerful 10 
solution is to build in prior knowledge that the computer programmer may have of the 11 
structure of the problem. Ideally this prior structural information will bias the computer 12 
program towards solutions that lead to better performance on data or related tasks. For 13 
example, a program that is pre-programmed to know that everyday objects, like bicycles, tend 14 
to consist of multiple parts can learn to understand new object categories from as few as one 15 
or two examples, to the same level of performance as humans (Lake et al., 2015). In contrast, 16 
otherwise identical programs that do not understand that objects can be decomposed into parts 17 
tend to generalise poorly. Hence, prior knowledge is essential for robust generalisation. 18 
 The third type of memory processing performed by the brain, memory updating, is 19 
thought to be mediated by the mechanism of reconsolidation. In something of a surprise to 20 
the neuroscience field, it was shown that previously consolidated memories could be made re-21 
labile simply by appropriately cueing their recall (Nader et al, 2000). This finding implies that 22 
each recall of a memory opens a temporal window of opportunity for the brain to alter it, and 23 
potentially incorporate new information into it. Memory updating can explain findings from 24 
cognitive psychology showing that memories of specific events can be updated to reflect 25 
information, including false information, encountered after the event, in what has become 26 
known as the misinformation effect (e.g. Loftus and Palmer 1974).  Findings from 27 
neuroscience suggest that the incorporation of information provided after the event is possible 28 
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during the window of opportunity that occurs at each recall of the memory. For our purposes, 1 
the key lesson is that that new learned information is not simply linked an original memory, 2 
but in fact the original memory itself is altered. This may result in aspects of the old memory 3 
potentially being lost in the process. In this sense, the brain performs a true updating, not 4 
simply an accumulation of information. 5 
 6 
4. Limited functioning of information storage and access technologies 7 
In this section we show that the functions of memory outlined in section 3 facilitate the 8 
achievement of one of the most important goals of education: the transference of learning. 9 
 The transference of learning involves information being used outside of the context in 10 
which it was initially learnt (Thorndike and Woodward 1901). It is widely accepted among 11 
educators that transference is a crucial component of education (Bransford and Schwartz 12 
1999; Perkins and Salomon 1992).ii Educators aim for the information that they convey to 13 
their students to be utilised under a variety of different conditions, inside and outside of the 14 
classroom (Bransford and Schwartz 1999) rather than the benefits of their learning to be 15 
confined to the context of learning. For example, a student might study population growth in 16 
ecology, learn that exponential growth of groups occurs when there are no barriers to slow 17 
growth, then transfer this learning to the consideration of infectious disease in epidemiology, 18 
concluding that diseases will spread exponentially if barriers are not in place (Kaminski et al 19 
2013). In this case, what is learnt about one case could be applied in another educational 20 
context (in another class) or outside of the classroom. Another example would be a student of 21 
history who learns about the dangers of populism by learning about one case in history and 22 
applies their learning to other historical cases, and then compares each of these cases to what 23 
is currently occurring within her home country. In the final case, the student could develop a 24 
general picture of the dangers of populism on the basis of considering two or more historical 25 
cases, and the general picture could then be used to understand current events.  26 
What is most important for our purposes is that all cases of transfer of learning are 27 
highly dependent on the functions of human memory outlined in section 3. This point can be 28 
 9 
understood by considering the various stages of information processing involved in the 1 
transference of learning.  2 
For transference to occur, information about different cases must be linked together, 3 
e.g. information about two cases of populism. If information about case of populism A is 4 
never connected to case of populism B then learning about case A will not be transferred to 5 
case B. In order to ensure that the information is linked where appropriate, an abstract 6 
representation must be formed that reflects the commonalities between the cases, e.g. the 7 
feature of the cases that are due to populism rather than something else. This requires 8 
abstracting away from the details that differ between the cases and detecting a common core 9 
(Kaminski et al 2009). Where people fail to engage in transfer of learning this can be because 10 
they attend too heavily to details of a specific case, failing to see the commonalities between 11 
cases (ibid.). Once an abstract representation has been formed, there is the potential to 12 
identify numerous different learning contexts in which previously learned knowledge could 13 
be applied. By applying learning across new contexts it will be possible to refine the abstract 14 
representation to reflect the new information that becomes linked together through the process 15 
of transfer. It will also be possible to change one’s view of the information learnt in the initial 16 
stages of learning. If one’s initial learning about populism is challenged by comparing it to 17 
other cases of populism, through the process of transfer of learning, the earlier learning can 18 
be updated.iii  19 
We have seen that each of these processes—linking together of information, 20 
formation of abstract representation, and updating of learned information—are facilitated by 21 
the nature of human memory systems. It therefore follows that the functions of human 22 
memory systems, other than the storage and retrieval of information—facilitate the core goal 23 
of education that is transference of learning.  24 
 It is worth noting that not all types of learning can be transferred. For some 25 
information, there is no way to find commonalities between examples to build an abstraction. 26 
For example, there is no way of predicting someone’s phone number from their name. This 27 
means that it would be impossible to study a list of name/phone number pairings to discover 28 
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some underlying structure with which to build an abstract model, that could later help you to 1 
predict a new person’s phone number based on name alone. In situations like these it makes 2 
sense to offload the information to external devices, both because they are good at storing a 3 
large amount of information, and because the student will not miss out on any abstractions by 4 
doing so. This observation is consistent with the claims made in the current discussion, 5 
however, because our aim is to show that there is a significant subset of information that can 6 
usefully be transferred by forming abstractions, and that this transference is likely to be 7 
missed with increased dependence on information storage and access technologies. Our claim 8 
is not that all information can usefully be transferred in this way.   9 
 10 
5. Educational Technologies and a Failure of Functioning  11 
So far we have argued that human memory systems function in ways other than simply 12 
storing and retrieving information, and that these functions are important to the achievement 13 
of transference of learning—a central goal of education. This section shows that the same 14 
functions are unlikely to be performed as students increasingly depend on information storage 15 
and access technologies.    16 
The argument outlined so far provides good prima facie reasons for accepting this 17 
conclusion. It has identified advantages for learning which are the result of the systems 18 
operating in ways that differ from how information storage and access technologies operate, 19 
i.e. solely providing a facility for storage and retrieval of information. This suggests that if 20 
people who increase their usage of information storage and access technologies also reduce 21 
the extent to which they internalise information to memory, they will miss out on advantages 22 
for learning.  23 
It is, of course, important for us to show that these phenomena—i.e. (i) the increase in 24 
use of information storage and access technologies and (ii) the reduction of internalisation of 25 
information to memory—reliably co-occur. Why should we think this? First of all, there may 26 
be cases where the co-occurrence would be intentional. For example, teachers who adopt the 27 
connnectivist viewpoint might decide that it is no longer important to teach students 28 
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information for storing in their internal memories, due to the existence of new technologies. 1 
This might be reflected in their teaching practice. Alternatively, widespread use of 2 
information storage and access technologies might lead to an unintentional reduction in 3 
learners’ internally stored information. For example, it has been found that people tend to 4 
forget information that they think will be stored externally (Sparrow et al 2011). If the process 5 
of using these external technologies is not sufficient to trigger the brain functions that 6 
facilitate transfer of learning, transference may become less likely.  7 
 To see why it is that the use of technologies does not involve the performance of 8 
these functions it is first important to note that there is more than one way that information 9 
storage and access technologies could be adopted, depending on (a) the specific technologies 10 
and (b) the aims of those adopting them. In some cases, students might go through an initial 11 
learning experience in which they cognitively process information before storing it to one of 12 
the technologies. Students using note-taking applications could fit this description. In other 13 
cases, students might never go through an initial learning experience in which they 14 
cognitively process information. They might instead be merely instructed upon how to access 15 
information from the technologies, for example by searching Wikipedia. In both types of 16 
cases students are susceptible to missing the benefits of transference of learning.  17 
 Let us begin by focusing on the second case, those students who do not cognitively 18 
process the information. As they have not processed the information, they cannot have built 19 
abstract representations of the information. Without building these abstractions, the students 20 
will not be able to identify new cases in which previous learning is relevant.  21 
 It might be thought, however, that students could simply search for information when 22 
they encounter a task or problem for which information stored in these technologies could 23 
usefully be applied. For example, a person interested in understanding how diseases spread 24 
could search information storage and access technologies, such as Google or Wikipedia, to 25 
find an abundance of information relating to the topic. There are a number of problems with 26 
this response.  27 
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 First of all, searches of this type will likely be too narrow to facilitate the type of 1 
transfer possible through the use of internal memory systems. This is because those engaging 2 
in the searches will not be aware of what information could usefully transfer and therefore 3 
would not search effectively for information. For instance, a search for information about 4 
how diseases spread that uses disease-specific keywords is unlikely to reveal information 5 
about the growth of populations in ecology. Although a description of the commonalities 6 
between these two processes may exist somewhere in the external storage system, successful 7 
discovery of this information would require that the person engaging in the search used the 8 
right search terms, i.e. terms that reflected the connection between the two types of 9 
information. However, students are unlikely to search in this way if they are unaware of the 10 
connection between the types of information because they have not formed an abstract 11 
representation reflecting the common core of the two types of information. And they will not 12 
have formed an abstract representation of this type if they have never internalised the 13 
information. 14 
 One way to understand this point is by considering Donald Rumsfeld’s infamous 15 
distinction between known unknowns and unknown unknowns. One natural interpretation of 16 
this distinction is that known unknowns are things that we know we do not know. On the 17 
other hand, unknown unknowns are the things that we don’t know that we don’t know.iv A 18 
learner who sought and found information about the growth of populations in order to gain 19 
insights about the spread of disease would have to know that there was a connection between 20 
these cases that they did not know enough about. However, if they have not formed an 21 
abstract representation of the common core of the two cases then they will not be aware of the 22 
connection. The information about the connection between the cases will be an unknown 23 
unknown. Consequently, the student is unlikely to find the information through a search of 24 
information storage and access technologies.   25 
  Second, even if students were reliably able to access the information they needed by 26 
searching information storage and access technologies to identify information that would be 27 
relevant to their learning, the process may be impractically time-consuming, or might 28 
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interfere with other cognitive tasks. Insights that we have gained from previous learning 1 
experiences are constantly informing new experiences that we have, inside and outside of the 2 
classroom. This can be achieved automatically or offline by the brain, therefore quickly and 3 
efficiently, without producing significant interference with other cognitive tasks. A switch to 4 
increased use of searching technologies may lead to these features being lost. 5 
  What about students who do engage in some cognitive processing before offloading 6 
information to information storage and access technologies? Will they too miss out on the 7 
benefits of transference of learning? Discussions from the neuroscience of memory suggest 8 
that they will. 9 
 The main difference between students who engage in some cognitive processing of 10 
information before offloading it and those that do not is that the former will temporarily 11 
engage with the information. Lessons from neuroscience suggest that this temporary access to 12 
information will not suffice to produce the abstract representations that are necessary for 13 
transference of learning. The research suggests that the process of memory abstraction is tied 14 
to the slow neocortical learning system so it takes time: minimally one night’s sleep, but 15 
perhaps several months (Rasch and Born, 2013). This implies that if students only briefly 16 
process the information and then it is actively forgotten, as it is likely to be when a student is 17 
aware that the information will be stored and accessible in an external device (Sparrow et al 18 
2011), the information is likely not to be stored for long enough to allow full abstraction to 19 
occur. 20 
In sum, then, students who offload information to information storage and access 21 
devices, and depend on their ability to later access information from the devices rather than 22 
retrieve it from memory, are highly susceptible to missing out on the advantages of 23 
transference of learning that internal memory systems supply.  24 
 25 
Conclusion 26 
Human memory systems do not function like a storehouse. They perform functions other than 27 
storing and providing access to information, including linking together information about 28 
 14 
different events, forming abstract representations, and facilitating the updating of information 1 
stored to memory. Each of these functions supports the transference of learning, which is a 2 
core goal of education. These functions may be impaired if future students become 3 
increasingly dependent on technologies that function more like a storehouse, i.e. information 4 
storage and access technologies. If so, the increased use of information storage and access 5 
technologies could undermine one of the main goals of education. We suggest that future 6 
educationalists should design teaching plans that deliver the types of information that would 7 
most help student build links and abstractions across material, while simultaneously 8 
encouraging students to offload non-structured or detailed information to external storage 9 
technologies, as appropriate. Such a balanced approach could maximise the benefits of both 10 
minds and machines.  11 
 15 
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